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
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
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900360001-8 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 February 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 25X1 II. ASIA-AFRICA 25X1 Sino-Indian Border Dispute: | Strong conservative pressure and fear of probable adverse public reaction apparently have caused Nehru to modify his previously reported intention to invite Chou En-lai to New Delhi for talks on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Nehru also told Parliament on 12 February--the day after Khrushchev addressed that body--that there is no bridge between the 25X1 Chinese and Indian positions and therefore no room for negotiations on the basis of present positions. Israel: The United States has been asked by Israel for military aid, including jet fighters, tanks, artillery, and missiles, in order to "restore" the balance of power in the Middle East which it says has been upset by Soviet arms deliveries to the UAR. The Israeli note suggested increased US economic assistance, which would enable Israel to obtain weapons elsewhere, as 25X1 a possible alternative to direct military support. Israeli armed forces at present are regarded as superior to those of the Arab states, but the Israelis claim their "deterrent capability" could 25X1 disappear within three years. 25X1 i 25X1

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	25 X 1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900360001-8	25X6
25X6	southwestern Cameroun. This resort to overt French military support is likely to set back Ahidjo's campaign to gain acceptance within the growing bloc of independent African states and will prob-	
25X1	ably inspire new denunciations by the USSR, which has already publicly condemned Ahidjo's decision to request French military assistance.	
25X1	Panama: New demonstrations against US Canal Zone policies are being planned and could take place as early as 15 February by the instigators of the anti-American disturbances in November 1959, Some American officials in Panama believe that recent US Congressional criticism of Panama's desire to fly its flag in the Canal Zone have induced a "state of widespread ferment" exceeding that which preceded the November demonstrations. Panamanian Govern-	25X1
25X1	ment spokesmen have commented that National Guard forces would not intervene in any anti-US outburst unless Panamanian property were damaged. The US ambassador feels that a new demonstration at this time would be ''on a vaster scale and more violent than the November incidents, probably involving blood- shed."	
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French Offensive Against Terrorists in Cameroun Reported Near

Direct and concerted military action by French forces against rebellious tribesmen and politically motivated terrorists in southwestern Cameroun will begin on 15 February, according to the British chargé in Yaoundé. Heretofore French Army units based in Cameroun were officially confined to border control activities. Last month, however, Prime Minister Ahidjo formally requested their tactical deployment in direct support of operations against the dissident elements, which include followers of the exiled extremist leader Felix Moumie. French forces remain in Cameroun, the former French-administered UN trust territory which became independent on 1 January, under a military accord signed with the Ahidjo gov ernment last December. They were recently reinforced to an estimated strength of 2,200 men.

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The main thrust of the projected offensive,

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will be aimed at Bamileke Department, most of which now is apparently controlled by the dissidents. French General Briand, who is in effective control of the entire operation, has stated his forces would act as "gently" as possible in the hope of rallying the people--many of whom are reported aiding the dissidents either voluntarily or as a result of pressure tactics by terrorists.

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This resort to overt French military support seems likely to set back Ahidjo's campaign to gain acceptance within the bloc of independent African states. The militant leaders of Ghana and Guinea, in particular, will claim it proves their contention that Ahidjo is a French puppet maintained in office solely by the French Army.

An Izvestia article in late January sharply criticizing Ahidjo's decision to request French assistance probably foreshadows intensified bloc attacks on Ahidjo's regime once the planned offensive gets under way. Despite its past support of Moumie, Moscow sent a delegation to Cameroun's independence celebrations and has offered both diplomatic relations and economic aid.

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III. THE WEST

Panamanians Plan New March on Canal Zone

Nationalistic student groups, civic organizations, and political extremists in Panama are planning new marches against the Canal Zone on 15 February or 1 March, or possibly on both dates. Students at the University of Panama finished their final examinations on 12 February; 1 March is National Constitution Day and also the peak day of the annual pre-Lenten carnival.

The demonstrators would try to plant Panamanian flags in the zone to protest US failure to acknowledge Panamanian titular sovereignty over the zone. American officials in Panama believe that Congress' recent refusal to allow Panama to fly its flag in the zone has induced a "state of widespread ferment" far surpassing that which preceded the anti-US outbursts in November 1959.

While Panamanian Government spokesmen have indicated concern and have promised to do everything possible to discourage the demonstrations, they also warned that the National Guard would intervene only if Panamanian property were damaged by mobs. Firm government action against anti-US mobs, however, could easily precipitate a popular uprising.

Any anti-US violence would be inspired by an extremist minority, but there is considerable evidence to indicate that such a course would receive much broader public support than last November's outbursts. The US ambassador believes any new demonstration would assume greater proportions than earlier incidents and probably involve bloodshed.

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